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The major programs for the disabled in the United States, Social 
Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI), are each intended to provide financial support to individuals who 
have an impairment that prevents them from engaging fully in produc 
tive labor force activity. As originally enacted, these programs based 
eligibility not only on evidence of a disabling condition but also on low 
earnings. Over the last several years, however, it has been increasingly 
recognized that the disabled are capable of at least some productive 
labor force activity and that basing eligibility on low earnings may pro 
vide work disincentives to existing recipients or even discourage some 
of the genuinely disabled from applying for benefits in the first place. 
In both programs, this development has led to changes in the rules gov 
erning earnings receipt, which are designed to encourage work. Addi 
tional programmatic changes to increase work incentives even more 
have also been proposed.
In this paper, we assess the implications of existing research on 
work incentives in programs for the nondisabled for the likely effec 
tiveness of the current and proposed work-incentive provisions in dis 
ability programs. While there has been relatively little study of work 
effects in DI and SSI, there has been a tremendous amount of research 
on the work incentives of transfer programs for the low-income popu 
lation, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and
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the Food Stamp program, and there has even been a small amount of 
research on the work-incentive effects of Medicaid. The relevance of 
this literature comes not so much from its rather large body of empiri 
cal evidence on the responsiveness of the low-income population to 
work-incentive provisions, since the responsiveness of the disabled 
may be quite different, as from the lessons that have been learned about 
the way in which work-incentive provisions operate and what their 
effects, both intended and unintended, might be. We shall argue that 
there are a number of important insights from this research literature 
that have implications for existing work-incentives and for proposed 
work-incentive reforms in DI and SSL
In the next section, we discuss the major U.S. transfer programs for 
the low-income population, what their work-incentive effects are gen 
erally presumed to be, and what the empirical evidence suggests on the 
impact of current work-incentive rules and of past and proposed 
changes in those rules. Subsequently, we provide a parallel discussion 
of DI and SSI and draw lessons for those programs from the literature 
on nondisability programs. We discuss the probable effects of both 
existing and proposed work-incentive provisions. In the final section of 
the paper, we draw policy conclusions.
Transfer Programs for the Nondisabled
In our discussion of nondisability transfer programs, we will focus 
on income-conditioned programs for the nonaged and therefore 
exclude both Social Security and unemployment insurance from our 
survey. Instead, we will concentrate on the AFDC program, the Food 
Stamp program, and Medicaid.
Description of Program Rules
The AFDC program currently provides cash benefits to families 
with dependent children, where a "dependent" child is defined as a 
child living in a family with only one parent or with an unemployed 
parent. 1 Most AFDC families are headed by women with no adult male 
present, although the AFDC Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) provi-
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sion permits some families to receive benefits where both parents are 
present. In families where income and asset conditions for eligibility 
are met, an adult's earnings, if any, are taken into account in calculat 
ing the amount of the benefit (which also varies by family size). First, 
earnings that cover work-related expenses are allowed, up to a certain 
maximum, without any reduction in benefits, as are earnings that cover 
child care expenses up to a maximum. In addition, for the first four 
months of earnings after joining the program, a deduction from income 
of one-third of earnings above work-related expenses plus $30 is 
allowed. The marginal tax rate (MTR) on earnings is thus 67 percent 
for earnings beyond deductions. The one-third disregard is eliminated 
after four months of earnings, leading to a 100 percent MTR on earn 
ings above deductions. 2 The AFDC program also imposes a maximum 
on the gross income a family can receive from all sources, earned and 
unearned; if income exceeds these amounts, eligibility ends. An 
increase in earnings that pushes family income above these maximums 
thus results in an MTR exceeding 100 percent. An MTR exceeding 100 
percent occurs when an increase of earnings of $1 leads to a decrease 
in benefits of more than $1. This can occur when eligibility ends.
The AFDC program provides extended, or "transitional," child care 
support to families who have been made ineligible for benefits because 
of increased earnings. Child care subsidies are provided for up to 12 
months following the date of exit from the rolls. These provisions can 
be thought of as lowering the effective MTR on earnings.
The Food Stamp program provides food coupons to all families with 
income and assets below defined amounts, with or without children 
and regardless of individuals' marital status. In computing benefits for 
families with earnings, a standard deduction is allowed, as well as a 
deduction of 20 percent of earnings and deductions for child care and 
shelter expenses up to certain maximums. Earnings above these 
deductible amounts reduce benefits by 30 cents per dollar, leading to a 
30 percent MTR. However, as in the AFDC program, families are made 
ineligible if income rises above certain limits. 3 This leads to an MTR of 
over 100 percent at the point at which earnings push a family above 
one of the maximums.4
The Medicaid program has historically provided subsidized or free 
medical care mainly to families receiving AFDC (or SSI) benefits. The 
types and amount of medical care for which an AFDC family is eligi-
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ble are independent of its income or benefit amount, and thus the tax 
rate on Medicaid benefits is implicitly zero as long as the family is on 
the AFDC rolls. Until recently, eligibility for Medicaid was lost in its 
entirety when a family left AFDC, generating an MTR of over 100 per 
cent on increased earnings at that point. However, Medicaid eligibility 
is currently not as closely tied to AFDC receipt as it once was. Many 
states have a Medically Needy program, for example, which provides 
Medicaid benefits to families who are below somewhat higher income 
and assets limits than those for AFDC or who experience heavy medi 
cal expenses that push their net incomes below those limits. In addi 
tion, recent federal legislation has extended Medicaid eligibility to 
some children and pregnant women in families who are not on AFDC 
but whose income is below 133 percent of the federal poverty line. 
Finally, transitional Medicaid benefits are available for up to 12 
months following exit from the rolls to families leaving the AFDC rolls 
because of increased earnings. These provisions, taken together, can 
once again be thought of as effectively lowering the MTR faced by 
individuals leaving AFDC.
Cumulative MTRs for families receiving multiple programs can be 
quite high (Keane and Moffitt 1994; Giannarelli and Steurle 1994). In 
many states, recipients who work part-time at the minimum wage rate 
have lower disposable incomes than they would have if they were not 
to work at all, implying an average tax rate of over 100 percent. Aver 
age tax rates between no work and full-time work at the minimum 
wage for program recipients are between 70 and 80 percent nationwide 
and exceed 100 percent in some states. 5 Aside from the Medicaid 
notch, which can cause high tax rates alone, separate notches are cre 
ated for AFDC and the Food Stamp program. In addition, payroll and 
income taxes generally raise the cumulative tax rate, since they are 
only partially (i.e., not fully) deductible in the programs.
Since the 1980s, most of the policy interest in these programs has 
centered on employment and training for welfare recipients instead of 
on financial inducements to work (the major current project of this type 
is the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) training program in 
AFDC). Such programs can be mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory 
employment programs necessarily increase work effort among those 
recipients whose participation is required, while voluntary work and 
training programs provide incentives through the prospect of increased
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future earnings or employ ability. If future wages and job prospects are 
increased by participation in such a program, the effective MTR (tak 
ing into account projected earnings) is lowered even if the current, 
nominal MTR is 100 percent.
Our paper is mainly concerned with the effectiveness of financial 
incentives rather than with the efficacy of work, employment, and 
training programs. However, we will discuss the policy merits of both 
approaches in our concluding section.
Expected Effects of Work-Incentive Provisions
The conventional labor-leisure model provides the framework 
within which work incentives of welfare program tax rates are gener 
ally analyzed. This model uses the assumption of utility maximization 
to justify the commonsense presumption that individuals trade off the 
amount of take-home income they would have for different levels of 
hours of employment with the desire to work and difficulty involved in 
that employment. As an empirical matter, the model implies that the 
choice of how much to work is based partially upon how much take- 
home income is gained by working various amounts, or by how much 
is gained by working less, in the case of some transfer programs.
The model is illustrated in figure 1, which shows the budget con 
straints for welfare programs with different tax rates. In this figure, 
segment A CDE, with slope equal to the hourly wage rate, w, applies to 
individuals off welfare. Segment BC applies to welfare recipients if the 
tax rate is 100 percent. Segment BD applies to welfare recipients if the 
tax rate takes on a value t that is less than 1. The theory implies that an 
individual will work less on welfare than off welfare, whether segment 
BC or BD applies.
A major focus of attention in the research literature has concerned 
the effects of a reduction in the tax rate on work effort. Perhaps surpris 
ingly, the literature does not yield a clear verdict on whether work 
effort would go up or down as a result. The arrows in the figure illus 
trate the types of responses that might occur from a shift from segment 
BC to BD. For individuals initially on welfare and not working (i.e., 
initially at point B), the reduction in the tax rate may encourage the 
type of movement shown by arrow 1, reflecting an increase in work 
effort. At the same time, a reduction in t expands the range of incomes
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eligible for the benefits. Unfortunately, some individuals who were ini 
tially ineligible for welfare and were hence initially off the welfare 
rolls are made eligible by the reduction in t; some of these people will 
go onto welfare and reduce their work effort, as illustrated by arrow 2 
in the figure. In addition, some individuals who are ineligible for bene 
fits even at the new, lower tax rate may take advantage of the financial 
inducement to combine welfare and work by reducing their work effort 
enough to become eligible for benefits, as illustrated by arrow 3. 6
Figure 1. AFDC Budget Constraints with Different MTRs 







The net effect of the reduction in the tax rate is thus ambiguous and 
could be positive or negative on the overall level of work effort. It is 
even theoretically possible that 100 percent tax rates result in the great 
est amount of overall work effort in the low-income, eligible popula 
tion. This would occur if any reduction in t below this level induced
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large numbers of individuals to come onto the rolls and to work less 
than they had been working off the rolls.
The possibility that large numbers of eligibles would rush onto the 
welfare rolls if the tax rate were lowered seems implausible in many 
circumstances. However, the same end result would occur even if entry 
rates onto welfare were completely unaffected by the level of the tax 
rate, but if exits from the rolls were. Assuming that individuals joined 
the rolls only because of unforeseen job losses, adverse health events, 
or other unplanned changes in household structure (e.g., divorce), the 
increased generosity of the program brought on by a low tax rate would 
decrease the likelihood that they would leave the rolls. There may be 
many welfare recipients who would, for example, ordinarily leave the 
rolls to take a full-time low-wage job if the tax rate were 100 percent, 
but who would choose to stay on the rolls and work part-time if the tax 
rate were lower. After a period of time, some recipients would end up 
working while on the rolls who would have otherwise been off the rolls 
working longer hours.7
Whether this possibility has any relevance to actual situations will 
be discussed in the context of the available empirical evidence. How 
ever, even if it is relevant to actual situations, it does not imply that 
reductions in tax rates below 100 percent are undesirable, only that 
they must be justified on some grounds other than as a means to 
increase average work effort. For example, it may be desirable per se to 
have welfare recipients work, even if this can only be achieved by 
broadening the recipient population to include individuals who would 
have otherwise been off the rolls (they are likely to be low-wage indi 
viduals as well, of course). Alternatively, it may be desirable to avoid a 
division of the low-income eligible population into those who are on 
welfare and not working and those who are off welfare and working 
long hours. A reduction in the tax rate that increases the work effort of 
the former group but reduces it for the latter group may serve to equal 
ize the distribution of earnings and income in the eligible population 
and lessen polarization. In addition, a program that offers income sup 
plements to individuals who work part-time but are still poor (assum 
ing that such work is covered by a low t) may be considered 
worthwhile simply because such persons are believed to be deserving 
of assistance, even if by doing so some recipients may reduce work 
effort from full-time to part-time. Finally, low tax rates may be a means
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to prevent underreporting of income and fraudulent work by individu 
als while receiving benefits. 8
Another possibility is that employment provides a welfare recipient 
with work experience and increased skills, thereby raising earnings 
ability (i.e., the wage rate) and encouraging exit from the rolls in the 
future. Whether the types of jobs that welfare recipients are likely to 
have while on the rolls provide a stepping-stone to permanent self-suf 
ficiency, or whether such jobs are likely to be high-turnover, dead-end 
positions that lead nowhere but back onto the rolls, is an empirical 
question. However, if progress towards permanent employment is the 
goal of the reduction in the MTR, it could be fairly asked whether job 
training programs are not a superior method of increasing skills.
Finally, the literature in this area has shown that the same work- 
incentive difficulties that arise with tax rate reductions occur when 
transitional child care and Medicaid benefits are provided (Moffitt and 
Wolfe 1990). In this situation, such benefits provide an incentive for 
individuals who leave the rolls to work less than they would have oth 
erwise during the transition period. Also, for those who are on the bor 
derline between applying or not applying for benefits in the first place, 
there is an incentive to apply because they know that transitional bene 
fits will be available should they go off the rolls. Consequently, transi 
tional child care and Medicaid benefits may have the undesirable effect 
of actually increasing the caseload and reducing average levels of work 
effort.
Empirical Evidence
Empirical evidence on the effects of welfare program tax rates on 
work effort comes from three sources: (1) econometric estimates of tax 
rate effects from cross-sectional survey data, (2) estimates from con 
trolled experiments testing a negative income tax, and (3) historical 
information from actual tax rate changes in recent decades in particular 
programs such as AFDC. We will not discuss any evidence on the 
effect of transitional child care and Medicaid benefits on work effort 
and the caseload, since those provisions have not been studied. Also, 
we will not look at the earnings and caseload impacts of welfare 
employment and training programs, since our focus is on financial 
inducements to work.
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Cross-sectional econometric estimates of the effect of welfare pro 
grams on work effort generally relate differences in hours of work to 
differences in benefit levels and MTRs among welfare-eligible individ 
uals living in states with varying benefit schedules (Danziger, Have- 
man, and Plotnick 1981; Moffitt 1992). Most of these studies have 
examined the effect of welfare on the level of work effort per se and 
have found that welfare programs provide some disincentive and there 
fore that work effort would be higher in the absence of the programs. 
However, only a minority of the studies examined the issue of whether 
the net effects of a change in the MTR on work effort would be positive 
or negative; instead, most studies estimated the "marginal" effects of 
changing the MTR conditional on program participation, that is, the 
effect of a change in the MTR on hours of work for those on AFDC 
before and after the change. 9 On this issue, the research showed non 
zero, but moderately sized, responses to benefit levels and MTRs: both 
higher benefits and higher MTRs are correlated with less work effort, 
assuming AFDC participation by the individual before and after the 
change. 10 Thus, arrow 1 in figure 1 was found to be significantly posi 
tive: when faced with a lower MTR, many AFDC recipients enter the 
labor force and work.
Three studies reviewed by Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick did 
estimate net effects of changes in MTRs, however. The research (Mas 
ters and Garfinkel 1977; Levy 1979; Barr and Hall 1981) found either 
no net effect of tax rates on work or a "perverse" effect, i.e., higher tax 
rates increase work levels. The explanation given for these findings 
was that the positive effects on the work effort of initial recipients are 
canceled out by the negative effects from new entrants and from a 
decline in the exit rate. Thus, the theoretical possibility of significant 
offsetting effects to the work incentives of lower tax rates is, unfortu 
nately, supported by the evidence.
There have been only a few additional studies of the AFDC program 
since the review by Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick, and these pro 
vide further evidence supporting the weak effects of changes in the 
MTR. Moffitt (1983) applied more advanced econometric methods to 
the problem but found, again, essentially no net effect on work effort 
due to changes in the tax rate. Keane and Moffitt (1994) incorporated 
the housing program into a model of AFDC and Food Stamps and 
found that changes in cumulative MTRs had very little net impact on
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work effort. Hoynes (1996), in the first work-incentive study of the 
APDC-UP program, found that reductions in the MTR on earnings had 
essentially zero net effect on the work effort of husbands and wives. 11
Only a few studies have been conducted on other programs. Fraker 
and Moffitt (1988) estimated the effects of the Food Stamp program on 
the work effort of female heads of household and found, again, that the 
net effect of MTR reductions was zero. Estimates of the effect of the 
Medicaid program on work effort have been conducted by Blank 
(1989), Moffitt and Wolfe (1992), and Winkler (1991). Two of the stud 
ies showed rather weak effects of the Medicaid program on work 
effort, while the third showed quite strong effects. However, none of 
these studies specifically examined the effect of the notch imposed by 
Medicaid. 12
The negative income tax (NIT) experiments conducted in the 1970s 
provided additional evidence on the responsiveness of welfare recipi 
ents to welfare programs (Burtless 1987; Moffitt and Kehrer 1981; SRI 
International 1983). In these experiments, a sample of the low-income 
population in several cities was selected, and its members were ran 
domly assigned either to an experimental group, which received a wel 
fare program (NIT) with varying benefit levels and MTRs, or to a 
control group, which was eligible only for the existing welfare system. 
Estimates were obtained by comparing work effort levels of the control 
group to those of the different experimental groups. The results of the 
experiments showed that an NIT with higher benefit levels than those 
in the existing AFDC system would reduce the work effort of female 
heads of household, and that an NIT of any type would lower the work 
effort of men and women for whom no existing program was available. 
The experiments also provided estimates of the responsiveness of wel 
fare recipients to changes in benefit levels and MTRs, assuming indi 
viduals to be on AFDC before and after the change. The estimates were 
found to be nonzero, but slightly lower in magnitude than those derived 
from cross-sectional survey data. 13 Unfortunately, the experiments pro 
vided little evidence on the net effect of changes in welfare program 
tax rates. In part, this is because the experiments were not designed for 
such estimates: the studies excluded families with income very much 
above the break-even level and hence could not capture the effects of 
tax rate changes that might arise from that group. 14
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Finally, some studies have been conducted on the effects of two his 
torical changes in the AFDC tax rate: its reduction from 100 percent to 
67 percent in 1969, as a result of the 1967 Social Security Amend 
ments, and its increase from 67 percent to 100 percent in 1981, due to 
the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA). Early studies 
of the 1967 Social Security Amendments examined the changes in 
employment and earnings among recipients remaining on the AFDC 
rolls; once again, the studies excluded responses from entry and exit 
and did not estimate net effects (Appel 1972; Bell and Bushe 1975; 
Smith 1974). The research suggested that work effort rose among 
women initially on the AFDC rolls. However, aggregate data on the 
AFDC participation rates and work effort levels of female heads of 
household in the United States in the early 1970s, just following the 
reduction in the tax rate, showed increases in participation rates and 
decreases in work effort (Moffitt 1992). Thus, net effects appeared to 
be zero, and, consequently, there was no evidence of increased work 
following the legislation.
The 1981 OBRA legislation has been evaluated more formally. The 
best study, conducted by the Research Triangle Institute (1981), exam 
ined the exit rates and work effort levels of women initially on the 
AFDC rolls at the time of the legislation, some of whom were made 
ineligible by the increase in the MTR. The results of the evaluation 
indicated that the increase in the tax rate to 100 percent had no discern 
ible work-discouraging effects on those who were initially on the rolls 
and working, in the sense that there was no evidence of their having 
reduced work effort to zero to retain eligibility for benefits. The study 
did find that the exit rate from AFDC increased, which is consistent 
with the expected effects discussed previously. Unfortunately, the 
study failed to gather information on the work effort levels of those 
who left the rolls following the change or on the work effort levels of 
those who failed to apply for benefits following the tax rate increase. 
Hence, the total (i.e., net) effect of the change could not be ascertained. 
However, once again, subsequent time series evidence on the work 
effort levels of female heads of household showed very little impact of 
the legislation (Moffitt 1986).
In summary, the empirical evidence from the welfare program litera 
ture reveals a consistent pattern of inelastic (i.e., weak) responsiveness 
of work effort to changes in MTRs. Despite MTRs of or in excess of
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100 percent, there is very little indication that reductions in those 
MTRs would induce any statistically detectable increase in overall 
hours of work or in employment among the low-income population. 
This realization by analysts and policy makers explains, in part, why 
efforts in the 1980s to change work patterns among AFDC recipients 
shifted so strongly toward employment and training programs and 
away from the use of financial incentives.
Transfer Programs for the Disabled
The primary cash transfer systems for the disabled consist of the 
Social Security DI and SSI programs. 15 DI is a major part of the Old- 
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. It was 
added to the program in 1957 and is designed to provide partial earn 
ings replacement to all workers under age 65 who sustain severe, long- 
term (typically career-ending) disabilities. All workers covered under 
Social Security (about 95 percent of the U.S. workforce) are also cov 
ered for DI benefits, and financing for the program comes out of 
employer- and employee-paid Federal Insurance Contributions Act 
(PICA) taxes. In 1993, the DI program provided benefits for about 5 
million disabled, nonaged individuals, for a total cost of $34.5 billion 
(U.S. House of Representatives 1994).
The SSI program provides benefits to the aged, blind, and disabled. 
The goal of SSI is to provide an income floor, and receipt is not tied to 
previous work experience. The program, enacted in 1972 and imple 
mented in 1974, is funded from general revenues, and benefits are stan 
dardized across the states. However, most states supplement the federal 
SSI benefits through their own SSI programs. On average, 4 million 
disabled workers and their dependents received monthly federal SSI 
benefits in 1993, for a total annual cost of about $35 billion. The dis 
abled represent about 75 percent of the total SSI caseload. DI recipi 
ents with low benefits can use SSI to supplement their income; about 
16 percent of DI recipients also receive SSI (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), Social Security Administration 
(SSA) 1994).
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Description of Program Rules
Both programs define disability as "the inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of medically determinable physi 
cal or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of 
not less than twelve months" (HHS, SSA 1992). Therefore, the medi 
cal definition of disability is not sufficient for benefit receipt. Instead, 
initial and continuing eligibility for both programs is tied to the ability 
to work. Substantial gainful activity (SGA) is defined as a threshold 
level of earnings, which is currently set at $500 per month. 16
Social Security Disability Income Program (DI)
Eligibility for DI requires meeting the definition of disability (as 
previously stated), having sufficient work history in Social Security 
covered jobs, 17 and not working, or working and earning less than the 
SGA threshold. When determining if earnings exceed SGA (both for 
initial as well as continuing eligibility), deductions are allowed for 
impairment-related work expenses (IRWE). The DI benefit is equal to 
100 percent of the worker's primary insurance amount (PIA), which is 
a function of the individual's earnings history in Social Security cov 
ered employment. 18 This benefit can be significant and is typically 
equal to the full value of the worker's potential Social Security retire 
ment benefit. In 1993, DI benefits for disabled workers averaged $642 
per month. The PIA calculation is based on a progressive structure 
under which high-wage workers obtain lower earnings replacement 
rates than lower-wage workers. The replacement rate in 1994 ranged 
from 78 percent for workers with low average monthly earnings ($500) 
to 29 percent among workers with high monthly earnings ($4,500) 
(U.S. House of Representatives 1994). 19
To analyze the work-incentive provisions of DI, we must examine 
the five possible phases of the program that working recipients can 
experience. First, there is a five-month waiting period after disability 
begins before benefits can be received (although there is no waiting 
period if the individual returns to the rolls within five years of leaving). 
Second, a trial work period (TWP) allows for nine months of employ 
ment over a 60-month period. If the individual earns over $200 in a 
month, it is counted as a trial month. Third, individuals who accumu-
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late nine months of work have their cases reviewed; if the work in 
which they have been engaged is "SGA" (generally meaning that it 
reflects an ability to earn more than the SGA monthly threshold), bene 
fits are extended for three more months (the grace period) and then 
stop. During the TWP, benefits are provided in full regardless of the 
level of earned or unearned income and are intended to let recipients 
test their ability to work, without danger of losing benefits. Fourth, 
recipients who have reached this point enter the extended period of eli 
gibility (EPE), which lasts 36 months. After the three-month grace 
period during the EPE, benefits are provided in full if earnings (net of 
allowed deductions) are less than SGA, but benefits are reduced to zero 
if earnings are over SGA. After the EPE is exhausted, individuals are 
dropped from the rolls if they have achieved SGA (or they must file a 
new application if they are still disabled). 20
The marginal tax rates (MTRs) on earnings in the DI program are 
generally much lower than those found in programs for the nondis- 
abled. During the TWP, for example, the MTR is zero. Further, the 
MTR is also zero during the EPE if earnings are below SGA. However, 
by eliminating benefits for workers over SGA, an MTR of more than 
100 percent is created on earnings that push the individual just over 
SGA. This creates a "notch" that resembles the MTR of over 100 per 
cent created by the loss of Medicaid benefits in the nondisabled pro 
grams discussed previously. Hoynes and Moffitt (1996) find that, 
overall, DI recipients considering entering the labor force on a part- 
time basis face average tax rates in the range of 60 to 91 percent, 
depending on their earnings capacity. Those considering entry at full- 
time levels face average tax rates of about 40 percent.
Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI)
While DI is an earnings replacement program, SSI is a means-tested 
transfer program that is not tied to previous work experience. The eligi 
bility and benefit formulas are consequently similar to those in the 
means-tested programs for the nondisabled. In order to be eligible for 
SSI, the individual must meet the definition of disability, have income 
and assets below the eligibility requirements, and not work, or work 
and earn less than the SGA threshold. The income test, asset test, and 
benefit level vary by living arrangement. The asset limit is $2,000 for 
single persons and $3,000 for couples, excluding home and automo-
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bile, while the income test requires that countable income, which 
includes both earned and unearned income, not exceed $446 for single 
persons and $669 for couples in 1994. The main deductions used in 
calculating countable income include the full deduction of IRWE, $20 
of monthly income, $65 of earned income, and one-half of the remain 
ing earnings. This creates an MTR of 50 percent for earnings above 
deductions. Benefits are equal to the program guarantee ($446 for sin 
gle persons and $669 for couples) less countable income. 21 These bene 
fit levels are adjusted annually for changes in the cost of living. All SSI 
recipients are also eligible for health benefits through the Medicaid 
program.
Work effort is observed to be quite low in both the DI and SSI pro 
grams. In a study of a sample of new entrants to DI in the early 1980s, 
only 10 percent of all participants had any work experience over a 10- 
year period following initial benefit receipt (Muller 1992). Three per 
cent left the rolls because of increased earnings, and 5 percent 
attempted trial work, but this did not result in SGA termination. Those 
who worked were more likely to be younger, white, female, single, 
with higher education levels, lower DI benefits, and less severe disabil 
ities. SSI workers have represented about 6 percent of the total SSI 
caseload since the mid-1980s (HHS, SSA 1993).
Expected Effects of Work Incentive Provisions
The DI and SSI programs are designed to replace (or supplement) 
earnings for workers who are unable to engage in "substantial gainful 
activity." There is, of course, a potential moral hazard problem associ 
ated with these programs inasmuch as disability is not a purely medical 
condition but may respond to economic and other factors. High bene 
fits or lenient application procedures may lure those in poor health, but 
with employment possibilities, out of the labor market. Furthermore, a 
high MTR may lead to low work effort among the recipient population.
To begin, consider how the existence of the DI program affects work 
effort among the disabled. First, eligibility requires that recipients earn 
less than SGA during the application and waiting periods. This will act 
to lower employment effort. The time spent out of the labor force while 
establishing eligibility may be quite costly, especially since many 
recipients are initially denied and since acceptance may follow only
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after a lengthy appeals process. Bound (1991) estimates that DI recipi 
ents are jobless for an average of 8.5 months before receiving benefits.








Second, the level of work effort is affected by the TWP. Figure 2 
shows the one-period budget constraint that operates for the TWP as 
well as for the grace period. Without DI, the relevant budget segment is 
ADF. During the TWP, benefits are received in full regardless of earn 
ings (MTR equals zero), thus shifting out the budget constraint by the 
amount of the benefit and resulting in the DI budget segment of ABCE. 
In this case, the DI program operates through a pure income effect, 
causing work effort to fall, for example. High benefits may induce 
some workers to accept DI and to reduce labor supply, possibly even 
leaving the labor force altogether.
Third, a different effect of the DI program on work effort is created 
during the EPE. The income opportunities during the EPE are shown
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by budget segment ABCD in figure 3. If earnings are less than SGA, 
benefits are provided in full. Above HBE, the break-even level of hours, 
the benefit is cut off completely, and the MTR is over 100 percent. In 
this case, the worker would have to increase hours of work to Hj to 
make up for lost DI income. The EPE, like the TWP, provides a nega 
tive income effect that reduces work, as illustrated by arrow 1. In addi 
tion, the notch provides a strong incentive to work at levels below 
SGA. In this situation, shown by arrow 2, some individuals who might 
otherwise have had high employment effort are induced by the DI ben 
efits to work less in order to remain below SGA. Overall, providing 
benefits to the disabled through the DI program will reduce labor sup 
ply among the disabled.
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These effects are not necessarily of greatest policy interest, because 
they concern the impact of the DI program relative to having no pro 
gram at all. Of more note are the expected effects of the DI provisions 
that are intended to provide work incentives, mainly the TWP and the 
EPE, relative to a DI program without such provisions. To examine the 
outcomes of these incentives, or of any proposed modifications in 
existing incentives, we need to consider not only differences in work 
effort among current recipients but any changes in entry and exit rates 
that (also) contribute to changes in the overall level of work effort 
among the disabled.
First, consider the effects of adding a TWP to a "strict SGA" pro 
gram in which benefits are unaffected if work is below SGA but are 
eliminated entirely for work above SGA. 22 The impact of the TWP on 
the budget constraint is illustrated in figure 2. Without any DI program 
at all, the budget constraint is ADF, while the budget constraint is 
ABCDE under the strict SGA DI program. The addition of the TWP 
prolongs benefits regardless of earnings, extending the DI budget con 
straint to ABCE. As intended, this change provides an incentive for 
those recipients who were initially at or a bit below SGA to work more 
than SGA, as shown by arrow 1. However, by making the program 
more generous for those who can and wish to work above SGA, exit 
rates from the program will fall in the longer term: some recipients 
who would have left in order to work above SGA will stay on the pro 
gram.23 Thus, while work effort among current participants may 
increase in the short run, it may fall in the long run. Those who would 
have exited the program will ultimately work less than they would have 
otherwise, as illustrated by arrow 2 (income effects induce a reduction 
in hours of work). In addition, benefits can now be received above 
SGA, which was not possible before, and this may affect entry rates, 
by creating incentives for eligible nonparticipants to apply for benefits, 
should they think that work above SGA is likely if they go onto DI. 
This would also increase the caseload and result in reduced work 
effort. Overall, the introduction of the TWP has ambiguous net effects 
on the employment effort of DI recipients and the eligible population, 
for the increased work among initial recipients may be outweighed by 
the likely future reductions in work among those who delay exit and 
those who enter.
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The effects of the EPE, which was introduced in 1980, are, at least 
at first inspection, more clear-cut: the benefit schedule reverts to its 
strict SGA form of loss of benefits for work above SGA (aside from the 
retention of Medicare benefits, whose effects are similar to the TWP 
and are provided above SGA). Once a worker is in the EPE, the incen 
tives to work above and below SGA are the same in each month as they 
were in the strict SGA program. However, the main impact of the EPE 
is in its provision of insurance for 36 months against a drop in earn 
ings. In the strict SGA program, a recipient might have hesitated to 
work above SGA because of the danger of not being able to sustain 
such high earnings and having to reapply for benefits. Avoiding this 
concern is part of the intention of the EPE program and presumably 
increases work effort during the EPE period.
Even with the EPE there is the possibility of increased entry. The 
greater generosity created by the EPE may make the DI program more 
attractive to eligibles who are on the margin of applying for benefits 
and may tip them in the direction of applying. Actually applying will 
depend on the extent of information about the DI program, whether eli 
gibles have reasonably good expectations of attempting to work when 
on the program, and on the costs associated with application. If any 
entry occurs, this will raise the DI caseload and reduce work effort, 
since those who enter will work less, on average, while on the DI pro 
gram than they would have if they had stayed off DI. Thus, in princi 
ple, the direction of the net effect of the EPE is ambiguous and can 
only be determined by empirical research. 24
This discussion shows that there is a basic similarity between the 
TWP and EPE work provisions of the DI program, on the one hand, 
and the MTR reductions in nondisability programs, which are also 
aimed at increasing work effort, on the other. Both have ambiguous net 
impacts on the recipient and eligible populations: while they have pos 
itive employment incentives for some, they also reduce exit rates and 
possibly increase entry rates, both of which lower long-run work effort 
(and raise the caseload). Each type of financial incentive operates by 
making the program more generous, and therefore more attractive, to 
working individuals as compared to their prospective situations off the 
program. 25
The work incentives of SSI differ considerably from those of DI, 
while they are similar to those in the AFDC or Food Stamp programs.
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The work incentives of SSI can be analyzed by referring to the welfare 
budget constraint for the nondisabled in figure 1, substituting the SSI 
implicit tax rate on earnings of 50 percent for t (t = 0.5 in figure 1). The 
50 percent MTR implies that if earnings are increased by $1, total 
income increases by only 50 cents. Benefits are phased out as earnings 
increase and reach zero at the break-even level (point D). As before, 
the static labor supply model implies unambiguously that the existence 
of SSI will reduce work effort among the disabled relative to having no 
program at all. There is an income effect associated with the guarantee 
(as with the DI program), but the 50 percent MTR induces a substitu 
tion effect that is not present in the DI program. The income and sub 
stitution effects work in the same direction, and hours of work must 
fall. If the MTR is reduced, the net impact on work effort is ambiguous 
in direction, however. As discussed for nondisability programs, such a 
reduction lowers work effort because of a delay in exit and an increase 
in entry.26
Empirical Results
The scope of the empirical literature on work incentives of disability 
income programs is somewhat limited compared to the literature for 
the nondisabled. The main body of empirical studies examines the 
effect of the level of DI benefits on program participation (or caseload 
size).^Participation in DI is typically estimated as a function of the 
potential DI benefit, which is imputed for those not on the program, 
individual attributes such as age and education, and locational charac 
teristics.28 The principal parameter of interest, the elasticity of DI par 
ticipation (or nonparticipation in the labor market), with respect to the 
DI benefit, varies widely in the literature. The results based on samples 
of older men (aged 45-62) provide elasticities ranging from 0.06-1.80. 
The highest elasticities in the literature are found by Parsons and range 
from 0.63 (Parsons 1980a) to 1.80 (Parsons 1980b). Slade (1984) esti 
mates an elasticity of 0.81. The magnitude of these elasticities is suffi 
cient to explain all of the observed decline in labor force participation 
rates by older men in the 1970s. Haveman and Wolfe (1984a) claim 
that Parsons' estimates are flawed and instead estimate an elasticity 
between 0.06 and 0.21 (Haveman and Wolfe 1984b; Haveman, de 
long, and Wolfe 1991). The other main estimates fall in the range of
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0.10 to 0.20 (Halpern and Hausman 1986; Leonard 1979). Older work 
ers, those in poor health and with greater disabilities, and individuals 
with lower earnings have been found to be more responsive to changes 
in benefits (Haveman and Wolfe 1984b; Slade 1984). de long, Have- 
man, and Wolfe (1988) find evidence that women are more sensitive to 
benefits, with estimated elasticities of 0.97 for female heads of house 
hold and 0.23 for married women. 29
Variation in the leniency of determining eligibility has been used to 
examine the sensitivity of DI participation to the uncertainty of bene 
fits. Parsons (199la) and Gruber and Kubik (1994) use over-time and 
across-state variation in DI denial rates to estimate how DI applications 
and nonparticipation in the labor market are affected by such uncer 
tainty. Parsons finds the elasticity of applications with respect to the 
denial rate to be -0.18. Gruber and Kubik find the elasticity of nonpar 
ticipation with respect to the denial rate to be 0.27.
While much of the empirical work in this literature is of great inter 
est, the results fall significantly short of what is needed to estimate the 
effect of the TWP, the EPE, or other work-incentive provisions. In the 
absence of direct evaluations of the TWP, for example, inferences 
about its effects can be made only by estimating the number of individ 
uals who would prefer to work above SGA but still receive benefits; 
wage elasticities as well as income elasticities are needed for this pre 
diction. The marked absence of attempts at estimated wage elasticities 
is, in fact, the literature's major defect for assessing the effectiveness of 
work-incentive provisions. 30 Furthermore, in these studies, participa 
tion in DI is considered equivalent to nonparticipation in the labor mar 
ket, which rules out examining the sort of responses shown by the 
arrows in figures 2 and 3.
As noted, the empirical evidence for nondisability programs should 
generate skepticism that there are any significant positive net effects of 
financial inducements for recipients to work while on the rolls. While 
the TWP and EPE are quite different in form from a simple MTR, the 
same types of effects are involved; therefore, the results from the non- 
disability programs should generate concern about the effectiveness of 
the TWP and EPE. In an assessment of whether the nondisability 
results are applicable to DI programs, one issue that would presumably 
be very important is whether the responsiveness of the disabled to 
changes in benefits and tax rates (i.e., their income and substitution
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elasticities) are similar to those of female heads of household and other 
low-income groups that commonly receive nondisability benefits. 
Whether the responsiveness is higher or lower seems unclear from the 
literature. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that the populations 
and programs are distinctive in many ways, which may contribute to 
different responsiveness levels. 31
Expected Effects of Reforms to DI Work Incentives
The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) reflects a 
desire to encourage labor force participation among the disabled. As is 
often noted, the existence of the DI program runs counter to this goal, 
by encouraging reductions in work effort among the disabled. Com 
pared to a program with a strict SGA limitation, however, the TWP and 
EPE features of DI do produce work incentives for current recipients, 
even though the direction of these features' overall impact is ambigu 
ous. Several changes to the work incentives of the DI program are 
under consideration, including increasing the SGA, extending the 
length of the TWP, and imposing a 50 percent MTR on earnings after 
the end of the TWP. 32
Raising the SGA increases the DI caseload but has ambiguous 
impacts on work effort among the disabled. 33 The change affects 
employment effort, program exit, and program entry in two ways. 
First, the costs of application are reduced because higher work effort 
can be sustained without exceeding SGA (as required for initial appli 
cation). Second, as shown in figure 4, increasing the SGA shifts up the 
notch in the budget constraint during the EPE. Increasing the SGA 
level from SGA0 to SGAj shifts out the DI budget constraint from 
ABCD to ABCEF. This will lead to increases in hours of work among 
some current recipients, as shown by arrow 1 in the figure. However, 
by allowing for higher levels of work with full benefits, the more gen 
erous program lowers the exit rate from the rolls for some recipients, 
who ultimately work less than they would have otherwise. In addition, 
the change attracts new applicants, who, if accepted into the program, 
will take advantage of the SGA to work while on the rolls; however, 
they will work fewer hours than they would have had they been off the 
rolls, as shown by arrows 2 and 3. Some of these new entrants are eligi 
ble under the expanded program (arrow 2), and others may take ad van-
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tage of the increased benefits and reduce their work effort to become 
eligible (arrow 3). This leads to a rise in the caseload, through 
increases in the entry rate as well as decreases in the exit rate.









Similarly, adding a partial benefit or MTR on earnings during the 
EPE will tend to increase work levels among current DI recipients, but 
the impact on overall work effort among all disabled persons is indeter 
minate in direction (the caseload will unambiguously rise). Figure 5 
shows the budget constraint for the EPE before and after the introduc 
tion of the partial offset, where the MTR is imposed only on earnings 
over the SGA. Under current law and with this expansion, the slope of 
the budget constraint below the SGA (ABC) is w, reflecting an MTR of 
zero. With the expansion, above the SGA there is an MTR of 50 per 
cent, which operates until benefits are reduced to zero. As before, 
arrow 1 shows the likely movement in work levels among current 
recipients. This increase in work effort is the intended effect of the 
expansion. However, a positive income effect and negative substitution
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effect suggest that work levels will fall for others, as shown by arrows 
2 and 3, both from reduced exit and increased entry. The potential 
growth in the caseload is quite large under this expansion. Using the 
average benefit in 1993 of $642, the break-even earnings level 
increases from SGA to about $1,800 per month or about $22,000 per 
year. 34









Extending the length of the TWP also has ambiguous effects on 
work incentives. By allowing recipients to work for more months 
before being taxed (e.g., before entering the EPE), the effective MTR 
in the program decreases. This will probably increase work levels and 
the length of time on the program for current participants. In addition, 
it may reduce exit rates for current participants and attract new partici 
pants, with both of these groups working fewer hours during the addi 
tional 12 months than they would have otherwise. This would augment 
the caseload as well.
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The empirical literature, as described, provides limited insight into 
the likely results of these proposed reforms to DI work incentives. In 
general, the impact on overall work effort depends critically on the rel 
ative sizes of the income and substitution effects for current recipients 
and potential entrants. Existing research provides very little reliable 
information on these parameters. The total effect also depends on the 
size of the increase in break-even income and on the density of the eli 
gible population in these areas of the earnings distribution, that is, on 
the relative numbers of disabled individuals who can and prefer to 
work just above the SGA.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
As the issue of increasing work incentives in the DI and SSI pro 
grams becomes of greater policy interest, the lessons from similar pro 
visions in plans for the nondisabled should be studied. Our review of 
the nondisability program literature demonstrates that simple financial 
inducements or changes in benefit formulas are unlikely to be as effec 
tive as they first appear. The empirical research on such reforms in non- 
disability programs is quite uniform in its failure to find strong 
responses to financial incentives and decreased MTRs. A set of possi 
ble explanations includes new entry into the programs as well as 
decreased exit. Our review of the empirical research on DI and SSI 
does not allow us to reach any conclusions about whether the magni 
tude of the responses in DI programs is likely to be greater than that in 
nondisability programs. However, the different types of responses to 
financial considerations, both the intended increases in work effort and 
the unintended reductions, should be present in DI and SSI, at least to 
some degree. This leads us to urge caution in using financial induce 
ments as a means of work-incentive reform in those programs without 
further, concrete evidence of their effectiveness.
Policy for AFDC recipients has evolved away from financial incen 
tives in recent years and has shifted toward the use of education and 
training programs to directly encourage, and sometimes require, work. 
This transition began in the 1970s and occurred in part because of the 
perceived failure of financial inducements, such as provided by the
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1967 Social Security Amendments, to increase AFDC recipient 
employment levels and to reduce caseloads. In addition, the move 
reflected a society-wide change in attitudes toward work by women 
with children, as it became increasingly the norm for such women to be 
employed rather than to stay at home. A similar change in attitudes 
toward the disabled appears to have occurred, with many arguing that 
all recipients should work to the degree they can. However, the use of 
financial inducements is still more favorably viewed in policy discus 
sions of SSI and DI than of AFDC and other welfare programs. As we 
have stressed, this perspective is not necessarily justified by the evi 
dence.
Finally, a recent policy direction taken for AFDC and related pro 
grams is to provide financial incentives to leave the welfare rolls via 
earnings and wage supplements for private sector work. The most 
prominent of these programs is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 
which provides supplements to low-income families and which has 
been greatly increased in generosity. The attractiveness of the EITC is 
that it has the potential to increase work and earnings and to reduce the 
welfare caseload at the same time. The philosophy behind the EITC 
and similar private sector wage subsidy programs is diametrically 
opposite to that behind the use of financial inducements to work more 
while on welfare; the latter has the potentially deleterious conse 
quences of increasing the caseload and reducing some individuals' 
work effort, which we have discussed at length. These undesirable 
results would not occur if financial incentives were offered only for 
off-welfare (or both on- and off-welfare) work. Policy discussions of 
disability assistance might fruitfully turn to wage subsidies, perhaps by 
investigating special private sector earnings subsidies for the disabled 
or modifications in the EITC to make more disabled individuals eligi 
ble for its benefits.
NOTES
NOTE The authors would like to thank Gary Painter for excellent research assistance and 
John Bound, Richard Burkhauser, David Stapleton, and Finis Welch for comments
1. The rules descnbed in this section can be found in the 1994 "Green Book" (U.S. House of 
Representatives 1994).
2. The $30 flat deduction is eliminated after 12 months of earnings Both the twelve months of 
a $30 deduction and the four months of the one-third deduction can be reestablished after one 
year, provided that the recipient has gone off AFDC and not returned in the intenm We should
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also note that some states use a payment method called "fill-the-gap," which permits a total disre 
gard of earnings up to a certain maximum, after which the tax rates noted in the text are applied.
3 Unlike the AFDC program, the FSP has two maximums, one on gross income and one on 
net income (i e., income after deductions). A family loses eligibility if either maximum is 
exceeded.
4 We should note that the AFDC benefit is included in countable income for those FSP recip 
ients who are also on AFDC This inclusion tends to lower the cumulative MTR for those who are 
on both programs, since an increase in earnings generally reduces the AFDC benefit, which, there 
fore, increases the FSP benefit. In simple cases, the cancellation is complete: a $1 increase in 
earnings lowers the AFDC benefit by $1, so countable income in the FSP is unchanged, and hence 
the FSP benefit is unchanged.
5 We have not discussed the MTR arising from participation in public and subsidized housing 
programs because there has been too little research on their effects Keane and Moffitt (1994) pro 
vide estimates of these MTRs.
6 Another possible response can occur if there are initially individuals along segment AC who 
are eligible for benefits but do not receive them, either because of a stigma associated with AFDC 
receipt or because the "hassle" and other costs of applying for and receiving assistance outweigh 
the benefits of the potential payment. A reduction in t, which increases potential payments, may 
induce some of these individuals to go onto welfare after all, with an associated reduction in work 
effort
It should be noted that the welfare program caseload unambiguously rises Providing work 
incentives by lowering the tax rate increases the caseload
7 In this discussion, we have to a degree shifted to a model of exit and entry, unlike the static 
model of our diagrams. In truth, even in the presence of "fixed" budget constraints, there are con 
tinual flows onto and off the rolls, in response both to unforeseen and uncontrollable events (lay 
offs, health events, etc ) and to conscious decision and purposeful behavior (e g , leaving the rolls 
to take a job offer) Purposeful behavior that takes relative income and work incentives into 
account will result in a long-run equilibrium similar to that portrayed in the static model, as a 
larger proportion of the population ends up with higher income.
8 Although very little is known of underreporting among AFDC recipients, many suspect it to 
be common, based on anecdotal evidence. One study of 50 AFDC families in Chicago found that 
all 50 were receiving some form of unreported income (Edin 1991). The general presumption in 
the literature is that the frequency and magnitude of income underreporting are positively associ 
ated with the level of the tax rate.
9. Technically, these studies estimated the substitution and income elasticities assuming that 
the budget constraint segment upon which individuals were located did not change.
10 That is, income elasticities are estimated to be negative, and substitution elasticities are 
positive
11 Another approach taken to estimating the net impacts of tax rates has been to simulate 
those effects from a microsimulation model, applying estimated elasticities from the econometric 
literature to representative household data bases (Moffitt 1992; Fortin, Truchon, and Beausejour 
1993). These studies confirm that lowering tax rates in welfare programs may reduce work effort, 
depending upon the size of the estimated responses but also upon the relative numbers of eligible 
individuals in different portions of the income distribution.
12 A recent study by Yelowitz (1995) did examine the impact of the Medicaid notch, however, 
and found that it had negative effects on the probability of working.
13. See Moffitt and Kehrer (1981) for details.
14 The experiments further excluded eligible nonrecipients, whose responses would also 
affect the net result in real-world welfare programs.
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15 Other public programs that provide cash benefits for the disabled include several veterans' 
compensation programs, workers' compensation, and (optional) state-provided temporary disabil 
ity benefits The discussion in this paper will be limited to the DI and SSI programs
16. The SGA is not indexed for price changes and has been increased nine times in the pro 
gram's 35 years. The SGA started in 1957 at $100 and was set at $300 from 1980 to 1990 before 
the latest increase to $500.
17 To qualify for DI, applicants must have worked 20 of the last 40 quarters preceding the 
quarter of application, although the rules differ somewhat for younger workers. The work history 
required for DI is virtually the same as that required for Social Security retirement benefits
18 The benefit can be as large as 150 percent of PIA for disabled workers with families.
19 The earnings figures refer to the worker's average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) in 
Social Security employment. The DI benefit, equal to the worker's PIA, is a function of the AIME 
Benefits are adjusted for changes in the cost of living. The PIA and AIME are calculated in 
roughly the same way as they are for Social Security retirement benefits
20 If a person has never achieved SGA, the EPE is extended indefinitely. However, benefits 
will be discontinued the first time that SGA is achieved.
Medicare benefits are available after 24 months of DI benefit receipt. Once the individual 
enters the EPE, Medicare benefits are obtainable for the next 39 months. Thus, Medicare is pro 
vided for three months past the end of EPE. Once a worker reaches age 65, the DI case is automat 
ically transferred to the Social Security retirement system
21 All figures refer to 1994 levels.
22 The original DI program did not have the TWP or EPE features. The TWP was introduced 
in 1960 and the EPE in 1980.
23. Once again, such exit rates can only be understood if it is realized that a dynamic model 
involving normal flows onto and off the rolls underlies the static diagrams we have drawn. Normal 
exits from the rolls occur, for example, due to job opportunities, even though the budget constraint 
does not change in the ordinary sense of the word Whether an individual takes advantage of such 
opportunities will no doubt be based in part on the relative income gain or loss associated with 
leaving versus staying on the rolls. These are the same considerations that underlie the arrows in 
our static diagrams, although in a dynamic context.
24 The EPE may also reduce exit rates from DI when averaged over the 36-month period. For 
example, recipients may try out a job with possibly short duration, knowing that they will proba 
bly return within a few months to collect benefits While this encourages employment among 
those who would not have worked at all, it discourages work effort by those who would have oth 
erwise chosen to go off the rolls altogether at a job with greater prospects of stability and longev 
ity.
25. Some important dynamic considerations of the DI program have been left out of this dis 
cussion. For example, even though benefits are not reduced during the TWP, potential benefit cut 
offs begin after nine months of work if the recipient enters EPE Consequently, taking advantage 
of the TWP will increase income at the time but decrease prospective income, effectively raising 
the MTR and reducing work effort Similarly, individuals who consistently work above SGA dur 
ing the EPE will eventually be dropped from the system altogether after 36 months, thus losing 
Medicare benefits as well as the insurance of DI benefits if wages fall below SGA. This also oper 
ates to increase the effective MTR Lastly, Medicare benefits will be lost three months after the 
end of the EPE when leaving the DI rolls. There is anecdotal evidence that losing health benefits 
may be a larger work disincentive for the disabled than the prospect of losing cash benefits 
(National Academy of Social Insurance 1994).
26 This discussion shows that the main difference between SSI and DI is in the treatment of 
earnings In SSI, SGA is only used when determining initial eligibility, and benefits are reduced
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with increases in earned income The notch in the DI budget constraint during the EPE does not 
exist in SSL However, this difference is only a result of recent legislative changes in the SSI pro 
gram Provisions referred to as 1619(a) and 1619(b) started in 1980 and were made permanent in 
1986 These provisions dramatically changed the earnings opportunities for disabled workers. 
Previously, SSI recipients had a trial work period, and Medicaid and cash benefits were lost when 
a worker had countable earnings that exceeded SGA. In that case, there was an MTR of 50 percent 
below SGA, at which point the remaining benefits (and Medicaid coverage) were lost in entirety 
Provision 1619(a) allows SSI (and Medicaid) benefits to be continued even at earnings exceeding 
SGA (until sufficiently high earnings move a person off the rolls completely). To ease the transi 
tion back to work, provision 1619(b) extends Medicaid coverage when workers' earnings render 
them ineligible for SSI benefits
27. This literature is critically reviewed in Leonard (1986) and in the exchanges between Par 
sons (1984) and Haveman and Wolfe (1984a) and Parsons (1991b) and Bound (1991)
The empirical studies of the work disincentive effects of the SSI and workers' compensation 
program are much less developed McGarry (1993) considers the impact of potential benefits on 
the take-up of SSI benefits among the low-income elderly
28. The majority of the literature defines the dependent variable to be labor force participation 
or nonparticipation (de long, Haveman, and Wolfe 1988, Gruber and Kubik 1994, Haveman and 
Wolfe 1984b, Parsons 1980a, 1980b; Slade 1984) Leonard (1979) specifies the dependent van- 
able as DI participant or nonparticipant Operationally, there is little difference between these 
approaches. Halpern and Hausman (1986) consider three states DI recipient, Dl-rejected appli 
cant, and nonapphcant Haveman, Wolfe, and Warhck (1988) consider the DI recipient, Social 
Security early retirement, and labor force participant choices
29 The elasticities cited are from the econometric studies that utilized cross-sectional data 
The time series studies are summarized by Leonard (1986)
30. Some of the studies (e.g., Parsons 1980a and 1980b) do include wages, but only their pre- 
disabihty level, and only in the form of a replacement rate, which results in neither an income nor 
a wage elasticity There are many difficulties in estimating the work-incentive effects of the DI 
program that are not encountered in the literature for the nondisabled Such problems include the 
endogenous nature of DI benefits, due to the relationship with previous work experiences, the 
uncertainty of DI receipt, and the difficulty in imputing DI benefits for nonrecipients These issues 
and their relevance for the empirical literature are discussed in Leonard (1986), Haveman and 
Wolfe (1984a), Bound (1991), and Hoynes and Moffitt (1996)
31. It is clear that DI recipients confront different obstacles to labor market success than do 
female heads of household Disabled individuals may face difficulties in labor supply (due to the 
physical or emotional conditions impacting the ability to work) and labor demand (due to the 
availability of jobs for persons with disabilities) Furthermore, contrasted with AFDC, receipt of 
DI benefits is uncertain and subject to long waiting periods because of difficulties in evaluating 
the medical definition of disability Lastly, the availability of public health insurance may be quite 
important for disabled workers, especially due to preexisting condition clauses in private insur 
ance
32 Specifically, the National Academy of Social Insurance report (1994) outlines five possible 
reforms: indexing the SGA amount to keep pace with wage growth, raising the SGA to the level 
for the blind ($930 in 1993) and indexing to keep pace with wage growth, providing a partial off 
set (MTR) of 50 percent to be imposed after the TWP on earnings above the monthly SGA; pro 
viding a partial offset (MTR) of 50 percent to be imposed after the TWP on earnings above $85 a 
month, and extending the TWP by 12 months With the partial offset, the work-incentive effects of 
the DI program are made more similar to those in the SSI program
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33 Increasing the SGA would also expand eligibility for SSI. The impacts are likely to be 
larger for the DI program since the SGA only affects initial (but not continuing) eligibility for the 
SSI program
34 This is calculated by setting benefits [B-0.5*(w//-500)] equal to zero, where w is the 
hourly wage and H is hours worked, and solving for the earnings level where benefits are just 
exhausted
Imposing a 50 percent MTR on earnings over an $85 exclusion during the EPE would result in 
closer parity between the SSI and DI work incentives. This change differs from those considered 
in the text: since the $85 exclusion is below the SGA level of $500, benefits would be lower than 
they are under current law for some ranges of earnings By increasing the tax rate (from 0 to 50 
percent), we may see a reduction in work effort for current recipients However, eliminating the 
notch (and its high MTR) and extending benefits past the SGA may result in an increase in work 
levels among some recipients. For this program change, the caseload as well as the net work 
effects are ambiguous. The direction of the change in entry and exit rates is not predictable since 
for some ranges for hours worked the program has been expanded while, for others, the program 
is less generous.
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